The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

Thematic discussion on item subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions submitted on all disarmament and related international security agenda items 87 to 106

The Chair: This afternoon we shall again focus on the nuclear weapons cluster, including the introduction of draft resolutions.

Mr. Vasiliev (Russian Federation) (spoke in Russian): Once again, Mr. Chair, I welcome you to your new post.

We have already had an opportunity, in the general debate, to set forth the Russian approaches to nuclear disarmament. Therefore, we would now like to deal with the key aspects in a concise way.

The Russian Federation is satisfied with the way in which the New START treaty, which entered into force last February, is being implemented. Active information exchange has been launched under this agreement, and inspection activity is being conducted. Within a few days the Bilateral Consultative Commission established by the Treaty will start its second session in Geneva. We assess its work as being productive.

We will present more details about the Treaty during the Russia-United States briefing to be held on the margins of the First Committee on 20 October. We ask everybody to participate in the briefing, which we regard as an excellent example of our implementation of the commitment in the Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The Treaty’s full implementation will strengthen not only the security of its parties, but also international stability, as well as help enhance the nuclear non-proliferation regime and expand the nuclear disarmament process. We are also of the view that successful implementation is possible only in strict compliance with the principles of equality, parity and the equal and indivisible security of the parties.

In the wake of the Treaty’s entry into force we have noticed growing expectations with regard to further steps in nuclear disarmament. We are open to a dialogue on this issue; we believe, however, that it is essential now to gather practical experience of implementation of the New START and assess objectively the quality and viability of the agreement. Such an analysis will help us make plans on the substance of new steps towards a nuclear-weapon-free world.

Another key issue that in our view requires particular attention is the growing need to give the process of nuclear disarmament a multilateral dimension. Unless we move forward on this, significant progress is unlikely to be achieved.

We welcome the decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, whose Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), agreed on the basis of mutual compromises, creates a basis for further development of multilateral approaches in the area of nuclear disarmament.
My colleagues from the United States and the United Kingdom have already informed the Committee about the outcome of the Paris meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council, held from 30 July to 1 August this year, and the declaration regarding an official document of the Conference on Disarmament and, as I understand it, of the General Assembly too.

The Review Conference decisions are comprehensive and provide for a contribution by all States to their implementation. This concerns also the relevant conditions for progressive reductions of nuclear weapons, which can be achieved only with due account of all factors affecting strategic stability. Since we spoke about these factors during the general debate, I will not repeat them now.

As a further development of the 2010 NPT Review Conference results, some countries or groups of countries intend to submit draft resolutions emphasizing certain aspects of the implementation of the Final Document. This work is important, and we of course support it. It is no less important, however, to ensure the integrity of the decisions taken and avoid their free or broad interpretation, since that would reopen the compromise achieved and possibly complicate the implementation of these important decisions.

One of the most acute topics on the disarmament agenda today is missile defence. The problematic aspects in the dialogue on the issue became apparent long ago, but still we do not see real progress in addressing them.

We are concerned that we have seen no readiness by NATO or the United States to allow equal participation by Russia in the development of the European missile defence concept and architecture, or to start to draft adequate confidence- and transparency-building measures as regards missile defence. Moreover, the apparent trend is now towards practical deployment of elements of the global United States missile defence system, which our military experts believe could, among other things, weaken Russia’s defence potential.

We are not dramatizing the situation. We are convinced that no one should keep quiet about the existing problems; they need to be addressed consistently and constructively instead of being covered up by declaratory and non-committal statements about the non-targeting of missile defence.

Unfortunately, over recent months there have been no significant shifts in addressing the key issues of interaction between Russia and the United States and NATO on missile defence. If events develop further in this direction the chance offered by the NATO-Russia Council Lisbon summit to move the missile defence issue from confrontation to cooperation will be lost.

Russia considers the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to be an important instrument to increase regional and international security and strengthen the nuclear-weapon non-proliferation regime. We fully support the idea of creating a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, in accordance with the NPT Review Conference decisions of 1995 and 2010. We are convinced that the zone’s early establishment would ensure a comprehensive solution to the issues of non-proliferation and the effective maintenance of peace and stability in the region.

Russia, together with other NPT depositary States, is making significant efforts to create conditions favourable to the convening of a conference on the matter in 2012. We trust that there will very shortly be positive developments with regard to the organizational issues. The conference’s success will wholly depend on the willingness of the Middle East States to engage in a constructive dialogue.

Russia reiterates its support for the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. We regard it as essential that the Treaty and its protocol are fully consistent with the established international norms and practice in this field. We have no questions regarding the content of the Treaty or the text of its protocol containing security assurances by nuclear Powers to the States parties to the Treaty. We fully support these documents, as we believe all nuclear-weapon countries should.

We also welcome the declaration of the nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. We have consistently voted for General Assembly resolutions on the zone. We hope that the consultations in New York will help remove the remaining questions and pave the way to signing a relevant protocol on security assurances.

During the current session one of the most pertinent issues is the prospect of launching negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). Russia has always called, and continues to call, for an early start to such negotiations. We strongly believe that the Conference on Disarmament
format can ensure the participation in negotiations of all States possessing the relevant capabilities.

It should also be borne in mind that holding negotiations on the Conference on Disarmament platform will not only help preserve this unique multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament, but provide an opportunity to launch discussion of other relevant issues within a balanced programme of work.

We call on all delegations — first and foremost those on whom it may depend — to strive to reach a compromise, including in the context of the First Committee draft resolutions on an FMCT and the Conference on Disarmament report. This needs to be done without delay, since tomorrow it may be too late, and we risk facing a collapse of the entire multilateral disarmament mechanism.

**Mr. Fasel** (Switzerland): I take the floor on the issue of decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear-weapons systems. I do so on behalf of Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Switzerland and Malaysia — our current coordinator, whose representative unfortunately cannot be here today due to his chairmanship of the Third Committee.

Since 2007, our countries have called for action to address the significant numbers of nuclear weapons that remain today at high levels of readiness. Our countries believe that there is an urgent need for action to address this situation.

It remains of deep and abiding concern to us that, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, doctrinal aspects from that era, such as high alert levels, are perpetuated today. While the tensions that marked the international security climate during the Cold War have lowered, corresponding decreases in the alert levels of the arsenals of the largest nuclear-weapon States have not been forthcoming.

We welcome the lower levels of alert adopted by some nuclear-weapon States. As with all other nuclear disarmament measures, it is the view of our Group that steps to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons should be irreversible, transparent and verifiable.

We welcome recent reductions in the numbers of nuclear weapons. What is also required is an increased recognition that the high level of alert of the remaining nuclear weapons is disproportionate to the current strategic situation, and that steps should be taken to address this inconsistency.

We are disappointed that recent reviews of nuclear doctrine have not resulted in lowered levels of alert. We are encouraged, however, that the door has been left open for further work in this area, and look forward to receiving an update on how this work is progressing.

We note the recognition by last year’s Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of the issue of de-alerting, and welcome the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to “Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear-weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems” (**NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), p. 21**), which they are to report on in 2014. Reports in the interim on how this work is progressing would be most welcome, and we will be pursuing updates at the Preparatory Committee meetings during the forthcoming NPT review cycle.

We believe that it is of the utmost importance to achieve greater transparency levels than exist at present with regard to such military doctrines. We view progress in this regard as a major task for the years ahead, which could facilitate further reductions of alert levels.

We have also taken heart from the recommitment by the nuclear-weapon States in the action plan to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament contained in the 2000 NPT Review Conference Final Document (**NPT/CONF.2000/28**), given the strong call in that document for action on operational readiness. A lowered operational readiness of nuclear-weapon systems would represent an important interim step towards a nuclear-weapon-free world. It would demonstrate a palpable commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons. In addition, steps to lengthen the decision-making “fuse” for the launch of any nuclear attack would minimize the risk of unintentional or accidental use.

We are keen to capitalize on changes in the global security environment since the end of the Cold War. The adversarial relationships of those bleak times are clearly behind us, and the threat of a conflict among major Powers has become remote. Against this backdrop, the rationale for high alert levels has lost its salience.

Our countries have presented a draft resolution on this issue to the General Assembly at previous
sessions. While we remain committed to the operational readiness issue, we will not be submitting a draft resolution this year. Rather, we will be looking ahead to the forthcoming review cycle of the NPT, starting with next year’s Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna, and measuring progress in that context.

We will be putting forward for discussion next year a paper that canvasses the substantive arguments in favour of lowering the operational readiness of nuclear arsenals, as well as considering the full range of steps available in the multilateral political process to take the issue forward. We will spare no effort in advocating progress towards lowering operational readiness, and will do so in all relevant forums, including at the General Assembly, and will look to revisit a draft resolution next year.

Mrs. Kazragiené (Lithuania): As this is the first time Lithuania has spoken during the current session of the First Committee, let me congratulate you, Mr. Chair, on your election and offer the full support of the Lithuanian delegation.

As a member of the European Union (EU), Lithuania promotes and supports the implementation of EU policies in the domain of international security, disarmament and non-proliferation.

Let me now touch on a few issues of particular importance to my delegation.

We welcome the successful outcome of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and support further strengthening of the NPT regime in all three mutually reinforcing pillars — disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

A world free of nuclear weapons remains our general vision for the future. In the meantime, effective implementation of existing multilateral and bilateral agreements related to nuclear arms control and further disarmament paves the way to achieving that goal. In that context Lithuania, as a non-nuclear-weapon State, regards confidence-building measures, reciprocal transparency and verification as integral and essential parts of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. Those measures should apply both to strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons. However, non-strategic nuclear weapons should be a priority, primarily because of their absence from arms reduction treaties.

In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, coherent multilateral efforts are needed to promote and strengthen the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system. Comprehensive safeguards agreements, and in particular the additional protocols, represent a verification standard that needs to be universalized and further strengthened. Moreover, it should be applied as an obligatory condition for nuclear material and technology supply worldwide.

There is a clear need to build a stronger connection between nuclear safety and nuclear security. The forthcoming Nuclear Security Summit in the Republic of Korea and such initiatives as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism might serve as frameworks for enhancement of the nuclear safety and security nexus.

In addition, the role of the IAEA is vital in enhancing nuclear safety and security. In this regard, we fully support the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety, which has just been endorsed at the IAEA General Conference in Vienna.

Any peaceful nuclear energy project in any State must be developed with due responsibility to the population of its own and other States. Open and honest consultations with all potentially affected countries, constructive settling of transnational disputes, full transparency and information-sharing must be universal norms.

Finally, Lithuania attaches great importance to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty regime. We welcome the countries that ratified the Treaty this year. At the same time, we remain concerned that none of the nine remaining annex 2 countries have ratified it since the last Review Conference. Lithuania urges all States parties that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT without delay and without conditions.

Mr. Seruhere (United Republic of Tanzania): It is a great honour for my delegation to share our perspective in this important thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

At the outset, let me restate that the United Republic of Tanzania is against those lethal weapons, whose presence and development continue to pose an indiscriminate threat to the peace and the security of all humankind.

It is an inalienable right of all nations to research and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, such as curing deadly non-communicable diseases,
increasing agricultural productivity, carrying out pest control, managing ground water, and generating power. The technology was the best innovation of the past century, but its use in weapons systems remains our worst nightmare.

The use of such weapons in a new millennium, when several States possess them, would certainly lead to a catastrophe of unimaginable dimensions. In this regard, we support every effort by the international community for the total, irreversible and verifiable disarmament of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

We are party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and are pleased with the commitment of some delegations to implement the action plan adopted at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT. The full realization of its goals will surely bring us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. Likewise, the entry into force of the CTBT will be a global public good.

The United Republic of Tanzania is also a party to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. We were delighted by the Treaty’s entry into force in July 2009, and look forward to the ratification of its protocols by the remaining members of the Security Council. We welcome the announcement by the United States that the matter is being considered by the Senate. A positive outcome will be a great present to the African continent.

We also welcome the entry into force, last February, of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia. We are aware that nuclear weapons will not disappear overnight; it is a matter of great comfort, however, that they are being dismantled.

It is a bitter reality that the possession of such weapons gives other States an excuse to acquire them. In a complex and unpredictable world, these are dangerous realities. Thus we deem complete disarmament to be the best way out of this quagmire. In that regard, we call for all declared and undeclared nuclear-weapon States to set out on the path towards nuclear global zero in a transparent and verifiable manner, under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The United Republic of Tanzania is not a member of the Conference on Disarmament, but shares the frustration expressed by most States, including the members of that sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament and arms control agreements. Despite the frustration, we must find a functional way out. There must be, without further delay, negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention; a fissile material cut-off treaty; peaceful uses of outer space; negative security assurances; and many other matters.

Perhaps the tranquil spirit that my delegation brings to these forums could be a positive factor in the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, it is very appropriate that we also consider the expansion of the machinery to give it a better multilateral appearance.

Nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes must go in tandem with nuclear safety and security. We must do whatever it takes to ensure that non-State actors, particularly terrorists, pirates, mercenaries and organized criminal gangs, do not get hold of these dangerous substances and weapons, as they do with conventional weapons, including small arms and light weapons, which devastate most of our communities on a daily basis.

The implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) is of paramount importance. IAEA supervision is pivotal, and cooperation between States in this area is crucial in averting unilateral innovations that genuinely raise suspicion in some of us. In particular, we call for the establishment of a common fuel bank under the custody and monitoring of the IAEA.

We commend the Secretary-General for convening the high-level meeting on nuclear safety and security during the current session. We support the outcome of the 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit, which underscored the multilateral efforts to suppress nuclear terrorism. Next year’s Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul has the potential to reinforce that agenda. We are hopeful that eventually the outcome will be shared with all Member States in this multilateral forum.

We are the United Nations against the perils of war, disease and poverty. It is our duty to eliminate all weapons of mass destruction. We must do that progressively and with the goal of achieving their total and irreversible elimination. Tanzania stands ready to do its part.

**Mr. Sorreta** (Philippines): The elimination of nuclear weapons is the only guarantee against their use or threat of use. The international community must
remain committed to ridding the world of this scourge. A global norm or an agreed objective for their total elimination already exists.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself and the outcomes of its 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, taken together, make it unequivocally clear that there exists the common objective of creating a world without nuclear weapons. The task before us, then, is to implement it, and to do so with a stronger sense of urgency. The Philippines urges the nuclear-weapon States to now convert into deeds their commitments, including those in actions 3, 5 and 21 of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. 1)) of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Action 3 says that “the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons” (ibid, p. 20) In this regard, the Philippine commends the United States and the Russian Federation for ratifying the New START, and hopes for even deeper cuts. It is also hoped that this disarmament process will eventually involve the other nuclear-weapon States.

Action 5 highlights the nuclear-weapon States’ commitment to “accelerate concrete progress ... leading to nuclear disarmament”, as specified in the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Among other things, it also calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons, regardless of type or location, and “further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies” (ibid., p. 21).

Action 21 encourages the nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals. Furthermore, the Secretary-General is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States. The Philippines looks forward to the nuclear-weapon States undertaking these actions as well as to the Secretary-General setting up the repository so that States will know and see the progress being made towards the objective of totally eliminating nuclear arms.

The Philippines is also concerned about tactical nuclear weapons. These devices could easily be smuggled through porous borders and be used by terrorists and other non-State actors to devastating and horrific effect. There must be serious discussions about this type of weapon during the next NPT review cycle.

We urge the few countries that have remained outside the NPT to heed the call for the universal application of the Treaty.

States must now also seriously consider negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, whether in the Conference on Disarmament or elsewhere. Such a convention is included in the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal and is referred to in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The Philippines strongly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and would like to see it enter into force as soon as possible. We urge the remaining nine annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty. The Philippines also enjoins non-annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty to do so. The Philippines welcomes the intention of Indonesia and the United States to ratify the Treaty, and hopes they will do so at the soonest possible time. Furthermore, the Philippines welcomes the positive outcome of the recently concluded article XIV Conference.

The Philippines sees the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices as a key component of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and an essential step. It is hoped that negotiations on it can begin in the Conference on Disarmament, but if that body remains ineffectual the Philippines agrees with those States that have called for alternative means and venues to be found.

The Philippines stresses the importance, as a contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will adhere to and accede to the respective protocols of the zones, especially that of the Bangkok Treaty. In this regard, the Philippines commends the nuclear-weapon States for their positive interaction with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in direct consultations last August and this October. My delegation hopes that Member States will support our draft resolution on the Bangkok Treaty.

The emergence and development of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the negative security assurances that they offer are tangible and effective opportunities to advance the global disarmament
and non-proliferation agenda. ASEAN is advancing the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone with the nuclear-weapon-free States, and is also initiating cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty regime through the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Philippines puts a premium on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and emphasizes the importance of having a successful conference in 2012. To that end, the Philippines urges the sponsors of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the Secretary-General to undertake as soon as possible the necessary actions, such as appointing a facilitator acceptable to all States in the region, and to designate a host Government for the 2012 conference.

The 64-point action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference expresses deep concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

In our statement in the plenary general debate last month, we emphasized the importance of a rules-based system in the conduct of international relations. This rules-based approach should also apply to the issue of nuclear weapons. The Philippines continues to strongly believe that the threat or use of nuclear weapons violate international humanitarian law.

**Mr. Kwon Hae-ryong (Republic of Korea):** Nuclear disarmament is crucial in reducing the threat of nuclear war and ensuring that such unthinkable power is never again used for destructive purposes against mankind. In that light, there have been many initiatives seeking to make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. A key example is the Secretary-General’s efforts to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world through his 2009 five-point proposal.

In the past few years, the world has seen significant progress in the disarmament and non-proliferation arena. Last year, the Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. A month later, at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) was successfully adopted by consensus for the first time in a decade. The New START treaty between the two major nuclear-weapon States entered into force in February.

However, given that there is still a wide gap in perception between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, it would be hard to assert that nuclear disarmament has been as successful as we had hoped. To narrow this perception gap, we believe, nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate a higher standard of compliance through sustainable nuclear disarmament measures. We firmly believe that deeper voluntary cuts by nuclear-weapon States will grant them greater moral authority and political legitimacy to call on non-nuclear-weapon States to join them in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

My delegation also strongly believes that in order to rekindle global efforts for nuclear disarmament it is of the utmost importance to restore trust and nurture a spirit of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Republic of Korea welcomes the results of the eighth NPT Review Conference and affirms that the NPT should continue to function as a cornerstone of global peace and security. Its three pillars — nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — should be bolstered in a mutually reinforcing manner. It is especially important to faithfully implement the 64-point conclusions and recommendations in the Final Document, which condensed the goals and wishes of all countries to realize a world free of nuclear weapons.

In our common effort to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and finally to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world, it is imperative that we ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We call upon those States that have not yet ratified it, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to do so immediately. We also stress the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing until the entry into force of the CTBT.

In addition, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is indispensable, not only for nuclear non-proliferation, but also for nuclear disarmament. We believe that the time is ripe for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation calls upon all Conference members to show more flexibility and political will so that negotiations can begin at the earliest possible date.

Any meaningful progress in the pace of negotiations for the conclusion of an FMCT will serve
The Republic of Korea also shares the concerns of the international community about the outstanding questions regarding the nuclear programmes of Iran and Syria. Iran's continued enrichment activities and lack of cooperation with the IAEA are sources of profound concern. Syria still refuses to allow the IAEA access to its entire nuclear activities and sites. We urge Iran and Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding questions about their nuclear programmes.

In order to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament, we must all reflect upon the evolution of the international environment and find a practical path towards a world free of nuclear weapons. What we need at this moment is the wise and balanced combination of being ambitious but realistic.

Mr. Zhang Jun'an (China) (spoke in Chinese):

The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and establishing a world free of nuclear weapons are the common aspirations of all peace-loving people in the world. We are glad that such a proposition has won increasing support and recognition by the international community.

In recent years, there have been signs of revival of the international nuclear disarmament process. The international community is actively implementing the Final Document of the eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The United States and Russia have taken some steps in implementing the New START treaty. China welcomes this positive progress.

Meanwhile, realizing the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and establishing a world free of nuclear weapons remain long-term and arduous tasks. The international nuclear disarmament process still confronts serious challenges. The research and development of new types of nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of missile defence systems have produced a negative impact on regional and international peace and security.

Under the current circumstances, maintaining global strategic balance and stability and promoting the international nuclear disarmament process serve the common interests of all parties and require the joint efforts of the international community. We should make the best use of the positive elements in the current international nuclear disarmament process, take the opportunity of implementing the Final Document of the eighth NPT Review
Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), champion a new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and work to pursue comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security, with a view to creating an international environment featuring mutual benefit and common security, and fostering favourable conditions for making progress in nuclear disarmament.

We should focus on the lofty goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and adopt a two-pronged approach of both promoting the nuclear disarmament process and reducing nuclear weapon threats, to consolidate and enhance the hard-won momentum of nuclear disarmament. To this end, China would like to reaffirm the following points.

First, all nuclear-weapon States should fulfill in good faith obligations under article VI of the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date.

The Conference on Disarmament is the sole appropriate forum for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Negotiations on such a treaty, with the participation of all relevant parties, should commence at the Conference as soon as possible.

When conditions are mature, other nuclear-weapon States should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons and take credible steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake no-first-use of nuclear weapons and negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another. Nuclear-weapon States should also unequivocally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a legally-binding international instrument in this regard at an early date.

Thirdly, nuclear disarmament must follow the principles of promoting international stability, peace and security and undiminished and increased security for all. The development of missile defence systems that disrupt global strategic stability should be abandoned. The multilateral negotiation process to prevent the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space should be vigorously promoted.

Fourthly, the international community should extend strong support to efforts made by countries of relevant regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We hope that all parties will make joint efforts and actively participate in the preparatory process, to achieve positive outcomes from the 2012 international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and is firmly committed to a nuclear strategy of self-defence. China has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and has made the unequivocal and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This open, unequivocal and transparent nuclear policy makes China unique among all nuclear-weapon States.

China has never deployed any nuclear weapons on foreign territory. China has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it ever do so. China will continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.

China is willing to work with the international community to continuously make unremitting efforts in promoting the international nuclear disarmament process so as to ultimately realize the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and to establish a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Tarar (Pakistan): The nuclear era following the Second World War witnessed a race for strategic nuclear superiority. During the Cold War, the major nuclear Powers continued their production and modernization of nuclear weapons despite knowing their catastrophic implications for humanity. Parallel to this, development
of nuclear weapons by some States in regions of conflict forced threatened States also to pursue the nuclear option in order to ensure their security.

Pakistan, along with other Non-Aligned Movement member States, has been stressing the need for nuclear disarmament for decades. The end of the Cold War had raised our hope of meaningful progress towards the long unfulfilled goal of total nuclear disarmament. It was hoped that the super-Powers, by undertaking drastic reductions in their nuclear arsenals, would lead the way towards complete and comprehensive nuclear disarmament. Yet those ephemeral hopes faded away as nothing changed in terms of the centrality of nuclear weapons to the security policies of major Powers, and the issue of nuclear disarmament remained confined to exhortations, declarations and rhetoric. Moreover, the current complexity of the international system lends itself to increased risk of miscalculation and accidental use.

The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (SSOD-I) recognized nuclear weapons as an existential threat to humanity. It agreed that disarmament and arms limitation, particularly nuclear disarmament, was essential to avert any possible use of nuclear weapons and to strengthen international peace and security. The only real guarantee against the possible use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. Pakistan, along with other members of the Non-Aligned Movement, has been stressing the need for nuclear disarmament for decades as the top priority in the field of international security.

Instead of halting these growing risks and reversing the negative trends, the major nuclear Powers have followed discriminatory policies based on double standards that have further increased the nuclear threat. In pursuit of the so-called balance of power, containment and commercial gains, they have violated their own principles of non-proliferation and gravely undermined the international non-proliferation regime. The imminent danger posed by these policies in our region has forced us to confront the consequences of these double standards.

Multilateralism is the only way to craft international instruments in the field of security and disarmament that enjoy legitimacy and respect. Such negotiations should pursue real disarmament and not be merely a facade. Moreover, the objectives and principles enshrined in SSOD-I provide the only framework that is comprehensive and non-discriminatory. Based on the principle of equal security of States, SSOD-I consensually agreed to sanctify the principle of consensus for multilateral disarmament negotiations. Several treaties have been negotiated on the basis of this principle.

However, recently we have heard arguments from some powerful States that this consensus is no longer valid. At the same time, they oppose the convening of a fourth special session devoted to disarmament to build a new consensus on global disarmament. The only possible explanation for such a paradoxical approach is that these States are not willing to abide by their commitment to renounce nuclear weapons.

The Charter obliges nations not to use or threaten to use force. Therefore, the intention to use nuclear weapons or the threat of their use is not only illegal but also morally indefensible. The demand for negative security assurances by the non-nuclear-weapon States is based on their desire to remove the ever-existent threat of a possible use of nuclear weapons against them. Denying them these assurances could only mean that the nuclear-weapon States want to preserve their option to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States. In such a scenario, how could the global environment be conducive to disarmament efforts when the nuclear-weapon States intend to preserve not only their nuclear arsenals but also the option to use them?

Some of those major States have now resorted to shifting the focus of the international community towards a much more limited goal of nuclear non-proliferation, albeit with a selective and discriminatory approach. This would not only preserve their eminent nuclear status in the global security architecture, but would also enable them to claim a sham progress in disarmament. This, perhaps, is the reason for their focus on a treaty to ban only the production of fissile materials but not to eliminate their fissile material stockpiles.

From a technical standpoint, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) that only seeks to ban future production of fissile materials is not even a non-proliferation measure, let alone a step towards nuclear disarmament. The retention of huge stocks of fissile material would allow the major nuclear Powers to continue producing nuclear weapons even if such a treaty were to be negotiated successfully.

However, if we are desirous of a treaty on fissile materials that has genuine non-proliferation and disarmament objectives, it must include reductions in
the huge stocks of existing fissile materials. That is a belief shared by many countries in addition to Pakistan. This approach is essential to ensure equal security of States, which is a cardinal principle in disarmament negotiations. This is particularly needed to redress the existing asymmetry in fissile material stockpiles in our region.

The pursuit of discriminatory policies by some major States regarding nuclear cooperation has fundamentally and qualitatively altered Pakistan’s security environment. We cannot remain oblivious to these dangerous developments. A fissile material cut-off treaty that only envisages a ban on future production of fissile material would accentuate this precarious situation. Pakistan is therefore obliged to oppose negotiations on an FMCT, due to our legitimate national security concerns.

Pakistan has repeatedly and unambiguously given the reasons for its opposition to an FMCT. However, Pakistan is ready to support commencement of negotiations on the other core issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. After all, the Conference on Disarmament is not there to only negotiate an FMCT.

Some delegations argue that the FMCT is ripe for negotiations. The question is what criteria are being used to make this judgement. If the ripeness is to be determined on the basis of the passage of time, then surely negotiations on nuclear disarmament should commence immediately, since it is the oldest issue on the Conference’s agenda. If the criterion is security interests, then we should proceed to negotiate negative security assurances, since this matter does not directly impact the security interests of any State and would contribute to the overall improvement of the global security situation.

Since the Conference on Disarmament has not been able to commence negotiations on any of those agenda items, it is clear that there are States in the Conference that are opposed to the commencement of negotiations on those three agenda items. Since they argue that Pakistan’s concerns can be addressed during the negotiations on an FMCT, why do they maintain that their concerns on the other three core issues cannot be addressed in the same manner?

With that logic, for example, the contentious elements pertaining to the issue of nuclear disarmament should not have prevented commencement of negotiations on this single most important agenda item for 32 years. However, if those States have legitimate security concerns they should openly state their reasons for opposing commencement of negotiations on the other three equally important, if not more important, issues on the Conference’s agenda. The fact that they have chosen not to do so raises serious questions about their motives and their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and indeed to the work of the Conference on Disarmament itself.

Mr. Camacho (Mexico) (spoke in Spanish): First, my country fully endorses the statement made by New Zealand on behalf of the countries of the New Agenda Coalition.

According to available data, there are currently more than 20,500 nuclear weapons in the world. Of these, about 5,000 are deployed and ready to be used, including some 2,000 kept in a state of high operational readiness. No one can feel safe in the face of such numbers, which are also an endless source of suspicion and apprehension. Those figures are absurd in view of the relation of forces since the Cold War. At a time of deep economic, financial, energy and food crisis, and other huge challenges, the enormous expenditure on nuclear weapons is in shocking contrast to the efforts and commitments regarding the achievement of greater economic and social development.

Furthermore, it is incomprehensible, if not irrational, to keep fuelling the notion that a weapon of mass destruction, the nuclear weapon, has a special strategic value in maintaining international peace and security. Mexico repeatedly questions the arguments for retaining such a weapon. What would justify its use, which would be contrary to all the principles of international humanitarian law, violate the Charter, and constitute a crime against humanity?

Mexico notes that an opportunity for nuclear disarmament exists in the new international situation, characterized by, among other things, the renewed commitments in the action plan drawn up at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and by the momentum of the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda in recent years. Those are encouraging signs when it
The unequivocal commitment to disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States is an essential part of the negotiating package of the NPT, which we regard as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. More than 40 years after the Treaty’s entry into force, the obligation set forth in article VI and addressed again in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 — to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race — has not been met.

In the past 15 years, those negotiations should have taken place in the forum with the mandate for them. However, the Conference on Disarmament remains at a standstill, the victim of its own rules of procedure, thus unable to reach the destination that the international community has assigned to it.

We strongly believe that the quest for a world free of nuclear weapons should not be made subject to the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament. We must move from words to deeds and find alternatives for action. We invite Members of the United Nations to be flexible and open in reflecting on what interests we benefit when we privilege structure and mechanisms over substance.

While we permit the impasse, nuclear weapons continue to exist, and we encourage their proliferation. More countries possess these weapons, and the nuclear-weapon States continue to make technical improvements to existing weapons. Until we make concrete progress, we shall lack incentives for nuclear-weapon States to get rid of such weapons.

Ms. González Román (Spain) (spoke in Spanish): I have the honour to take the floor to offer several thoughts on the events of recent months in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We have seen positive elements, but we have also seen an impasse in certain areas. While momentum came with the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the entry into force of the New START treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, there are other factors to set against those positive elements. They include the ongoing standstill at the Conference on Disarmament; that negotiating forum cannot move forward on a programme of work and cannot undertake negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Those factors have undermined the high expectations that prevailed.
With that background, my delegation reaffirms its commitment to reinforcing and implementing the existing multilateral instruments, in particular the NPT, which we regard as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation system.

Spain supports the full development of the action plan agreed at the last NPT Review Conference. However, in our view the system requires two other pillars: the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT).

For Spain, the entry into force of the CTBT is a priority, as is its verification regime. The Treaty has been open for signature for more than a decade. However, we still have not been able to muster the political will needed to bring it into force.

Spain is concerned about the lack of progress over the FMCT. Hoping to bring about consideration of fissile material in the Conference on Disarmament, my country — with Bulgaria, Germany, Mexico, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and Turkey — presented document CD/1910, “Working document on a fissile material cut-off treaty”. We again thank those countries that endorsed the initiative, joining other members of the Conference that are also concerned about the standstill that has existed for more than 14 years. While the impasse continues, Spain calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to declare and implement an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

For the same reasons, we welcome every initiative to drive forward this effort, including the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, whose member countries met in Berlin in April 2010.

On the regional front, Spain attaches great importance to the nuclear-weapon-free zones. We welcome the recent conversations between the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the five permanent members of the Security Council regarding a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South-East Asia.

We also support the recent steps to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. We trust that a conference to that end will be held in 2012, with the participation of all the States of the region. In that context, I reaffirm Spain’s commitment to the universalization of the NPT.

If we set aside the international initiatives, and instead focus on the international situation, we see that there are reasons for concern. The members of the international community must remain united when facing situations that threaten international peace and security. We must adopt the necessary response measures unanimously and with resolve. We understand the decisions of those countries that wish to develop their nuclear capacity for peaceful purposes, as long as they do so responsibly, transparently and in strict compliance with their international commitments.

I take this opportunity to underscore the important work done by the International Atomic Energy Agency as the guarantor of the safeguards system. We must guard against weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorist groups. We emphasize the importance of complying with obligations and commitments under Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1887 (2009).

Spain is firmly committed to initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Nuclear Security Summit and the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, which aim to prevent all the dangers of asymmetric proliferation.

Our review of the most recent events concerning nuclear weapons reaffirmed our impression that the situation has both dark and light areas. Despite the undoubted promising signs of progress with regard to disarmament and non-proliferation, we also see evidence that the disarmament mechanism needs review, as do some of the practices and realities in some States which give rise to concern.

We have an obligation to move ahead in the direction established by the positive facts. We see clearly that the dynamic of consensus is also possible in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We should not be discouraged; we must make corrections where mistakes are most evident. We all know where the problems are, and I would even dare say that the great majority of the international community agrees on possible solutions. All we need to do is to move from words to deeds.

Mr. Diallo (Senegal) (spoke in French): My delegation is pleased to take part in this thematic debate on nuclear weapons, and welcomes the opportunity to share its views on this important issue, which is
the focus of the attention of the entire international community.

My country at the outset reaffirms its strong commitment to our shared goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, a goal that requires all our energy. The very existence of nuclear weapons is a serious threat to the survival of humanity, especially now that there is a great risk of their getting into the hands of hostile groups. That is why my country is convinced that their total and complete elimination is the only guarantee against their use.

Despite the slow and muted progress that has marked the 41-year existence of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), we are convinced that the Treaty, the cornerstone of the global disarmament and non-proliferation regime, may enable us to achieve our goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

There is all the more reason to hope because of the emergence here and there of welcome encouraging signs that, with strong political will and close cooperation, it is possible to achieve this noble objective. It is therefore necessary to work to strengthen the authority of the NPT, through its universalization and compliance with commitments made. In this respect, following up implementation of the action plan and recommendations of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, including the commitments made by nuclear-weapon States, will undoubtedly be a crucial step on the way towards nuclear disarmament.

Furthermore, article VI of the NPT clearly calls upon States to pursue the goal of nuclear disarmament by negotiating in good faith. Therefore, States parties should meet their obligations by adopting, among other things, a list of specific actions to implement article VI, based on an agreed timetable and a transparent supervision and control regime. The adoption of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, as mentioned in article VI, will also be a decisive step towards nuclear disarmament.

Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are two linked goals of equal importance. There cannot be general and complete disarmament if, in addition to the existing nuclear States, other States bypass the NPT to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. That is why our nuclear non-proliferation efforts must go hand in hand with effective disarmament, in accordance with a verifiable and irreversible timetable.

In this regard, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has a key role to play in the adoption of bold measures to counteract the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, it must be admitted that the IAEA can properly discharge its duties only if we agree to make available to it the means and tools needed to, among other things, strengthen its verification and supervision capacity.

The current non-proliferation regime is far from being credible. The time has come to make tangible progress by strengthening the actions proposed by the 1995, 2005 and 2010 Review Conferences. In that regard, we must work for the full implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, adopted at the 1995 Review Conference, regarding the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. My country therefore calls for concrete action for the holding next year, as agreed, of the conference that should lead to the creation of such a zone in the Middle East.

My country, which welcomed the entry into force on 15 July 2009 of the Treaty of Pelindaba, making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone, remains convinced that the creation of a similar zone in the Middle East would be a useful addition to the global non-proliferation regime and would at the same time contribute to the establishment of lasting peace in the area, by strengthening trust between States.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile materials for military purposes would contribute effectively to enhancing efforts towards general and complete disarmament. Similarly, the adoption of a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances would help bring about a better climate of trust between States.

In conclusion, I recall that simple professions of faith and declarations of intent will never achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Beyond that, we need full awareness of our individual and collective responsibilities, which we can meet through a strong political will.

Ms. Pesämaa (Finland): It goes without saying, Mr. Chair, that you have the full support of our delegation. We extend assurances of our firm cooperation to your Bureau as well.
Finland warmly welcomes continued global arms control and nuclear disarmament efforts. In the past 18 months we have seen a series of positive events, including the successful outcome of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the signing and entry into force of the New START treaty, which is a major achievement, and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit.

For Finland, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Finland is fully committed to work to strengthen the NPT regime. Finland supports the outcome of the NPT Review Conference and does its utmost to implement the action plan agreed by the Conference.

Finland considers that reductions in tactical or non-strategic nuclear arsenals and inclusion of these weapons in a legally binding, verifiable international treaty system are of high importance. Today no treaty arrangement limits tactical nuclear weapons. The reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons would strengthen security and positively impact on international security as a whole. Transparency and information exchange, as well as other confidence-building measures, would be important first steps.

With regard to nuclear security, Finland hosted a so-called sherpa meeting in Helsinki last week in preparation for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Loose or poorly guarded nuclear or radioactive materials pose a threat to us all. Specific action nationally and at both the regional and global levels is therefore urgently called for. We see the process as a new and unique opportunity to strengthen the existing nuclear material security architecture. It has initiated an important high-level political and technical process, which has raised general awareness of the need to secure nuclear materials worldwide. We thank all participants in the Helsinki meeting for their constructive work, which we hope will be a good basis for the next Sherpa Meeting in New Delhi next January.

Last but not least, as a long-standing member of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Finland is firmly committed to promoting its early entry into force. The current voluntary moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests is of great importance. However, Finland underlines the fact that a moratorium cannot be a substitute for a global ban.

It is time to close the door on nuclear-weapon tests. The entry into force of the CTBT will considerably strengthen the world’s security architecture. The provisional verification regime embedded in the Treaty has already proved to be very useful, as was seen in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, when the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization provided crucial assistance through its monitoring stations. Now it is time to act: Finland calls upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to do so without further delay.

Mrs. Ledesma Hernández (Cuba) (spoke in Spanish): International peace and security continue to be threatened by the existence of more than 22,000 nuclear warheads, half of them ready for immediate use. The employment of just a tiny part of this arsenal would bring nuclear winter, and with it the destruction of all life on Earth. It is unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon States are not renouncing such weapons as part of their security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence. Even worse, they spend billions of dollars to develop and update their nuclear arsenals.

Cuba believes that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, completely immoral and unjustifiable in any circumstance or under any security doctrine. Their use would be a flagrant violation of international norms with regard to preventing genocide.

The only guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used by States or anyone else is their elimination and total prohibition under strict international control, which should also apply to conventional weapons of a similar lethality. Nuclear disarmament is, and should continue to be, the highest disarmament priority, as leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have said repeatedly and at the highest level, and as was established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) made it very clear that the rhetoric and good intentions of some of the nuclear-weapon States are far removed from the commitment and concrete steps that they are willing to make. We urge them to ensure that the modest measures in the action plan adopted at that Review Conference are fully implemented.

Further, the entry into force of the agreement between the main nuclear Powers to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear arsenals is a positive sign.
However, it is insufficient. The nuclear Powers have not complied with their commitment under article VI of the NPT to negotiate an international treaty for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Cuba believes that the lack of political will on the part of some States, resulting in there being no real progress, principally in nuclear disarmament, is what has perpetuated the paralysis of the United Nations disarmament machinery. As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, we support the adoption, as quickly as possible, of a broad and balanced programme of work that has regard to the real disarmament priorities.

The Conference on Disarmament must urgently begin negotiations on a convention prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons, and providing for their destruction, leading to their total elimination in a non-discriminatory, verifiable manner, in accordance with a specific timetable.

While the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty would be a positive step, it would not be enough on its own, if we did not define the subsequent steps to bring about nuclear disarmament.

We oppose the selective approach promoted by some States that gives priority to horizontal non-proliferation, to the detriment of concerns about vertical proliferation and ignoring the fact that general and complete disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons are the true goals.

We support the inalienable right of States to research, produce and use, without discrimination, nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Further, we defend the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the urgent adoption of legally binding, unconditional, universal security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

Finally, I echo the words of the Declaration on the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons that NAM adopted at its fiftieth anniversary, reaffirming that nuclear disarmament is its top priority in the disarmament sphere. We declare our firm commitment to work for a high-level international conference to determine ways and means to eliminate nuclear weapons as soon as possible.

Mr. Steinhübel (Czech Republic): I should like to make just a brief observation on the issue under discussion today — nuclear weapons and their elimination in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.

As a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Czech Republic supports the implementation of all articles of the Treaty, including that relating to nuclear disarmament. However, we are of the view that the long-standing objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons may be achieved only if all demands to strengthen the non-proliferation regime are met. We stress the key role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard, and we support all activities aimed at elevating the international verification standard to the highest level.

I reiterate that the universal adoption and implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains essential for our further endeavours in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Based on our experience, we are convinced that those two instruments are the most important tools of the IAEA for detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear materials.

We agree with the conclusions and recommendations of the action plan approved at the most recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes a set of concrete recommendations with regard to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we are of the view that at present the international community is far from setting a concrete deadline for reaching that objective. We are aware that there are still many questions, both political and technical, that need to be addressed and resolved to this end.

In view of recent major proliferation challenges, it is of the utmost importance that all States take concentrated and resolute action to ensure strict compliance with their non-proliferation obligations, and respond quickly and effectively to non-compliance. We must pursue responsible development to ensure the highest standard of safety and security measures, and to avoid an increased risk of proliferation.

In our view, the International Atomic Energy Agency nuclear security programme is essential to addressing the threat of the acquisition of nuclear materials or weapons by non-State actors or terrorists. The programme must be supported not only financially, but also through universal implementation of both
A/C.1/66/PV.11

legally binding instruments and recommended security and physical protection guidelines and measures.

The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons again confirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination. We do not question the inalienable right of any country to do so, if it does it in a responsible way.

However, it is entirely unacceptable to us if some countries, while ignoring approved and recognized international standards that they have committed themselves to observing, endanger stability in their regions and raise the risk of proliferation. Such behaviour has always raised the grave concerns of the international community, and naturally also slows down the processes of nuclear disarmament.

Ms. Mehta (India): Thank you, Mr. Chair, for this opportunity to share briefly India’s perspective on issues related to nuclear weapons.

India has been consistent in its support for a world free of nuclear weapons. We have always tempered the exercise of our strategic autonomy with a sense of global responsibility. As our Prime Minister, Mr. Manmohan Singh, stated in the General Assembly on 23 September (see A/66/PV.22), the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for a Nuclear-Weapons-Free and Non-Violent World Order provides a concrete road map to attain the goal of nuclear disarmament in a time-bound, universal, non-discriminatory, phased and verifiable manner. We remain committed to the objective of that Plan and the realization of its vision of ushering in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world order.

We believe that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed global and non-discriminatory multilateral framework. There is need for a meaningful dialogue among all States possessing nuclear weapons to build trust and confidence and for reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and security doctrines. The progressive de-legitimization of nuclear weapons is essential to the goal of their complete elimination.

While we work towards that goal, measures must be taken to reduce nuclear dangers. Measures to reduce nuclear dangers arising from accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, increasing restraints on the use of nuclear weapons, de-alerting of nuclear weapons, measures to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear weapons — all are pertinent in this regard. In a working paper submitted to the General Assembly in 2006, India suggested a number of such measures, including reaffirmation of the unequivocal commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to the goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and specific legal measures, such as a global no-first-use agreement.

Without prejudice to the priority we give to nuclear disarmament, we support the negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament of a non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices that meets India’s national security interests.

Nuclear energy remains an essential source of clean and sustainable energy for a number of countries, especially developing countries. We must ensure its expansion, along with enhanced international standards of nuclear safety and reduced proliferation risks, implemented through effective national action.

India’s commitment to global efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery has been unwavering. These efforts are in India’s interest, as the infirmities of the non-proliferation regime have had an adverse impact on India’s security.

All States should fully and effectively implement the obligations arising from the agreements or treaties to which they are parties.

India’s position on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is well known and needs no reiteration. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India’s national security and will remain so, pending non-discriminatory and global nuclear disarmament.

India’s draft resolutions in the First Committee give expression to India’s approach to nuclear issues, as well as to our desire to work with fellow Member States of the United Nations in pursuit of nuclear disarmament, which was assigned the highest priority by the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2).

Accordingly, we are introducing on behalf of the sponsors a draft resolution (A/C.1/66/L.45) on reducing nuclear danger. It highlights the need for a review of nuclear doctrines and for immediate steps
to reduce the risk of unintentional or accidental use of nuclear weapons, including through de-alerting and de-targeting nuclear weapons. It advocates an objective which is modest yet crucial for the safety and security of mankind. We are happy that the issues raised by this long-standing draft resolution are finding greater resonance and recognition in the international community.

Further, we have the honour to present on behalf of the sponsors a draft resolution (A/C.1/66/L.46) on a convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. The text reflects our belief that a multilateral, universal and legally binding instrument prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would contribute to the process of de-legitimization of nuclear weapons and create a favourable climate for negotiations on an agreement prohibiting nuclear weapons.

Ms. Anderson (Canada): Canada takes the floor after a year of some important advances in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, but is disappointed to note that this progress has come in spite of, rather than because of, the existing multilateral disarmament machinery.

Canada congratulates the United States and the Russian Federation on the ratification and entry into force of the New START treaty. With the implementation of the Treaty, efforts for joint verification of mutual reductions in deployed nuclear-weapon systems have restarted.

Together with nine other Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty non-nuclear-weapon States, Canada is working within the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) to make practical contributions to non-proliferation, which were outlined in a statement released by NPDI Foreign Ministers following the 21 September ministerial meeting of the Initiative in New York. Action items for the Initiative include encouraging greater transparency by the nuclear-weapon States to build trust within that group and in the broader international community.

The NPDI is also focused on efforts to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) that would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, a key follow-on action identified by the 2010 NPT action plan.

As the first President of the Conference on Disarmament in 2011, Canada expended considerable effort to get the Conference back to work. Prior to the beginning of the Conference’s 2011 session, we consulted with all Conference member States, observer States and relevant civil society groups in an effort to identify a formula for a programme of work that would allow negotiations to begin in the Conference, in particular towards a fissile material cut-off treaty.

As everyone in the Committee knows, those efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, as positions of Conference on Disarmament member States on a programme of work continue to be entrenched and mutually exclusive. One State refuses to allow a programme of work that includes negotiations of an FMCT, even though it had supported those negotiations two short years ago, while most others would not accept a programme of work that does not include an FMCT.

Canada was disappointed that consensus was blocked last year on an FMCT draft resolution; only two years ago it enjoyed the support of all members of this Committee. Canada is again running the FMCT draft resolution, and has made efforts to present a text which strives for consensus while refusing to accept the status quo of continued inaction.

Despite the lack of progress within the Conference on Disarmament, our NPDI partners — Australia and Japan — co-hosted a series of side events on the margins of the Conference which explored technical questions that will need to be addressed in the negotiation of an FMCT. Canada and the NPDI are determined to support further progress towards FMCT negotiations, and appreciate the political capital which Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has personally contributed to this goal.

(spoke in French)

Finally, dealing with existing and new cases of non-compliance with nuclear non-proliferation commitments is key. The necessary trust to disarm will remain elusive if the international community is unable to deal with confirmed cases of non-compliance.

Canada calls on Iran and Syria to fully and immediately cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to resolve outstanding questions about the nature of their respective nuclear programmes. Canada remains gravely concerned about Iran’s nuclear activities, activities that can only be understood in the context of a nuclear weapons development effort. Iran has unambiguous legal requirements placed on it by the Security Council that it continues to ignore.
IAEA has sought greater cooperation and engagement on the part of Iran to address the issues of concern surrounding its nuclear ambitions, announcements and activities, Iran has refused.

Despite Iran’s claims of meeting its absolute minimum requirements under its safeguards agreement, the IAEA has been clear in saying that Iran is not meeting these obligations and is in a state of non-compliance. This failure to cooperate with the IAEA to resolve these issues after so many years has done nothing but undermine any Iranian claims that its nuclear programme is peaceful. Canada calls upon Iran to cease its campaign of concealment and obfuscation and take steps towards restoring its relationship with the international community by cooperating fully and without delay with the IAEA.

Canada notes with deep concern that Syria has been referred to the Security Council with regard to the clandestine construction of a nuclear facility at Dair Alzour. Syria has had ample opportunity to cooperate effectively with the Agency in resolving this issue, but has refused to do so. Canada would deeply regret Syria’s pursuing the same path of intransigence as we have seen from Iran.

We also call upon North Korea to demonstrate a sincere commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, through concrete actions and not merely words. It was Canada’s concern about the ongoing nuclear activities of North Korea that led our Foreign Affairs Minister, John Baird, to suspend Canada’s participation in the Conference on Disarmament during North Korea’s presidency.

The Chair: I give the floor to the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on a point of order.

Mr. Ri Tong Li (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): I apologize for interrupting the remarks of the representative of Canada. She referred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as “North Korea”. She has referred to it as North Korea in the past, and today I cannot stand aside. I kindly ask you, Mr. Chairman, to draw the attention of the representative of Canada to this matter, in the light of the code of conduct prevailing in the United Nations.

The Chair: I note the comments of the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and kindly request countries when referring to other countries to use their full name or the name usually used within the United Nations context. The rules on this issue are that when speaking of other countries one should use the official name, or an abbreviation.

Ms. Anderson (Canada) (spoke in French): Multilateral disarmament negotiations must not indefinitely remain hostage to procedural tactics and abuse of the consensus rule in the Conference on Disarmament. If the Conference remains unable to fulfil its mandate, other processes should be considered in an effort to fill that vacuum.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): My statement is rather long. I shall omit some paragraphs, and the whole statement will be distributed.

The continued existence of thousands of deployed and undeployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons around the world continues to seriously threaten international peace and security and the very survival of human civilization.

While there is no pretext to justify the possession of nuclear weapons by any country, it is a source of grave concern that certain nuclear-weapon States continue to allocate billions of dollars to develop new types of nuclear weapons. These new nuclear weapon production facilities modernize and replace such weapons. Equally, those countries, in contravention of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), continue to exhort us to leave aside a nuclear defence policy, but promote the role and status of nuclear weapons in their own defence and security doctrines.

It is ironic that instead of committing to their unconditional security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, given at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, certain nuclear-weapon States, such as France, motivated by Cold War thinking, have made irrational statements threatening non-nuclear-weapon States.

Furthermore, NATO, in an unwelcome action when adopting its new Strategic Concept at its Lisbon summit in 2010, explicitly stated that “NATO will remain a nuclear alliance”, recognizing that “[t]he supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States; the independent strategic nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a
deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies”.

By so doing, NATO member States maintain the rationale for the use of nuclear weapons, which is a clear setback for nuclear disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and a violation of their legal obligations under the NPT and the commitments agreed by its nuclear-weapon States parties at successive Review Conferences since 1995.

Under article I of the NPT,

“[e]ach nuclear-weapon-State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly”.

Contrary to that obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries in Europe and the Republic of Korea, and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States have been trained to deliver these weapons under the cover of military alliances.

The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, which has clearly confessed the deployment of United States nuclear weapons in the territories of the European Union, is tantamount to a serious case of non-compliance with the NPT, and a source of profound concern.

The other area of concern is the growing trend of nuclear sharing by nuclear-weapon States. Sharing nuclear weapons information among nuclear-weapon States, particularly between the United Kingdom and France, as well as transferring nuclear weapons information and materials to non-parties to the NPT, is a clear case of non-compliance with the NPT. Nuclear-weapon States, especially the United States, the United Kingdom and France, instead of threatening others and crying wolf over other countries’ behaviour, should fully comply with their obligations under article I of the Treaty by refraining from nuclear-sharing, under any pretext, including security arrangements or military alliance.

Certain nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and France, are non-compliant with their NPT obligations by continuing nuclear-sharing with the only non-party in the Middle East, which constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. France has also covertly provided that regime with all kinds of missile technology and materials to promote its capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction. According to international experts, the Zionist regime’s Jericho I ballistic missile is based on the French missile MD 600. It is ironic that France cried wolf in this Committee about the proliferation of missiles in the region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to fully support the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline, including the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, based on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work, for the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon instrument. Such negotiations must lead to legally prohibiting, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country, and provide for the total destruction of such inhumane weapons by 2025, as well as a universal and unconditional legally binding instrument on negative security assurances as an intermediate step.

In our view, any attempt to undermine the Conference on Disarmament by hijacking its established mandate or pushing it towards a one-sided programme of work is doomed to fail. In this context, the recent proposal for negotiations on one of the four core issues outside the Conference on Disarmament is in clear contravention of the agreements reached at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

The international community has noted the New START, but as this Treaty does not go beyond mere decommissioning of nuclear weapons and lacks any international verification mechanism, and as its parties did not commit themselves to destroying their nuclear weapons, it can never be a substitute for the explicit legal obligations of nuclear-weapon States to completely eliminate all their nuclear weapons.

In the past few years, certain nuclear-weapon States, by overemphasizing the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States on non-proliferation, have attempted not only to overlook their own nuclear disarmament obligations, but also to infer that nuclear-weapon States have no obligations related to non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, through false and misleading propaganda, they similarly have tried to equate nuclear energy with nuclear weapons. This false misinformation has been
highlighted, while all the nuclear activities of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT are under the full-scope safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and, as they have already forgone the nuclear option, pose no threat to others.

In this context, I would like to refer to some misinformation contained in the written statement of the United Kingdom, which was distributed yesterday, as was Canada’s statement today. The United Kingdom made a reference to the development of nuclear weapons in Iran. This absolutely incorrect information reminds me of a wise proverb: “Every mad man thinks all other men mad.” We should also recall the deadly silence of the United Kingdom delegation, as well as of Canada, regarding the Zionist regime’s secret nuclear weapons programme, which is the most serious threat to regional and international peace and security.

All nuclear activities in Iran are exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the IAEA has never found any diversion in those activities. As regards the reference in the statements of the United Kingdom and Canada to Iran’s 20 per cent enrichment activity, I would like to clarify that it is aimed at providing needed fuel for the Tehran research reactor to enable it to continue producing medical isotopes for more than a million patients with serious diseases like cancer. Therefore, this activity is purely for humanitarian purposes and credible. Iran had requested the suppliers, through the IAEA, to provide new fuel for this reactor; regrettably, that request was rejected. Consequently, Iran had no choice but to produce fuel itself.

The other misleading information in the United Kingdom and Canada statements is the reference to concealment of Iran’s nuclear facilities and activities. According to the safeguards agreement, Iran should only inform the Agency 180 days before the introduction of nuclear materials into the facility; in all cases Iran had declared the facilities to the IAEA even before the due date. So the allegations made by Canada and the United Kingdom are absolutely incorrect.

In conclusion, let me reiterate once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a victim of weapons of mass destruction, will vigorously pursue the goal of a world free from weapons of mass destruction, but will never submit to intimidation and pressure.

Mr. Hoffmann (Germany): As this is the first time I have taken the floor, I congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee this year. I welcome your intention to conduct our work in a spirit of openness, transparency and efficiency, and assure you of the full support of my delegation.

Germany’s assessment of the current situation in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is mixed. We welcome the progress made over the past 18 months. The forward-looking action plan agreed by consensus at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the entry into force of the New START treaty have undoubtedly created a positive momentum.

At the same time, there are, however, less encouraging developments, which we fear may mean that we could be losing the positive momentum that we have seen. Therefore, the First Committee should not only provide an honest assessment of the challenges we face, but give an impulse to actually deal with these challenges. This applies not only to regional cases of nuclear proliferation, but also to the continued stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament.

In line with the European Union (EU) Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Germany remains dedicated to the principles and objectives of effective multilateralism, prevention and international cooperation.

Germany firmly subscribes to the long-term goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, and supports all appropriate steps towards that goal. We would welcome a faster pace in nuclear disarmament and a reduced role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines. At the same time, we see progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as intrinsically linked.

Against this background, Germany considers the strengthening of all three pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in a balanced manner to be one of the foremost tasks of the international community. The NPT has been serving as the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime, and as the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with its article VI, and it provides an international framework for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We therefore call on all States that have not yet done so to adhere to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

Germany is firmly committed to contributing to the implementation of the action plan agreed at the last NPT Review Conference, both with its EU partners and
Notwithstanding this decision, Germany remains a committed international partner in all matters concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in particular in ensuring the highest possible safety and security standards. We fully respect the right of each nation to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

However, the consequences of nuclear accidents do not stop at borders, and nuclear non-proliferation is of vital interest to all nations. Thus, the peaceful use of nuclear energy implies a shared responsibility. We have to further develop a global nuclear safety culture.

Germany will continue to be a most committed and reliable partner within the IAEA and all other relevant international forums in this respect. The IAEA safeguards regime plays a key role in ensuring that nuclear energy is used in a peaceful way. We support the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with the additional protocol, becoming the universally accepted international verification standard.

The international community continues to face serious nuclear proliferation challenges. Grave concerns about the nature of the Iranian nuclear programme persist. Germany calls upon Iran to comply with its international obligations and to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors in order to restore the international community’s confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme.

Germany remains committed to working towards a comprehensive, negotiated long-term solution together with its E3+3 partners — the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France and Russia — and the EU High Representative. Iran must now take a strategic decision to seriously address the nuclear issue. Our offer for dialogue remains on the table, and we call on Iran to engage seriously in concrete discussions over its nuclear programme.

Practical steps are also of crucial importance with regard to facilitating the implementation of the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East. That is why we welcome the successful seminar organized by the European Union in July 2011, as well as the initiative of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to convene in November an Agency Forum on Experience of Possible Relevance to the Creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, as meaningful preparatory work for the convening of the international conference on the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Germany firmly supports the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, as a means to reinforce the global non-proliferation regime and to contribute to nuclear disarmament. In this context, we welcome the recent renewed momentum regarding the South-East Asia nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Germany has decided to phase out the use of nuclear energy for electricity production with an even more ambitious timeline than was envisaged before. The last German nuclear power plant will shut down by 2022.
Germany supported the decision of the IAEA Board of Governors in June 2011 to report Syria's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement to the Security Council. Full cooperation with the IAEA, compliance with its safeguards agreement and bringing into force an additional protocol are crucial to resolve all outstanding issues.

Germany notes with deep regret and concern that the multilateral disarmament machinery remains in a state of virtual paralysis. Worse yet, it appears that the Conference on Disarmament has moved even further away from the adoption of a programme of work in past months, when it had actually agreed on one in May 2009 by consensus. Unfortunately, as a result of the objections of one member, it has not been possible to implement it to this day.

Yes, the Conference on Disarmament has an impressive historical record, but let us be honest — after nearly 15 years of standstill it can no longer rest on its past laurels, nor can we be complacent about its looming continued impasse, when this protracted stalemate is undermining the security interests of the international community as a whole.

Membership of the Conference on Disarmament is a privilege that comes with responsibilities, one of which relates to the use of the consensus rule as a guiding principle to reach mutually agreeable solutions, and not as a means to block singlehandedly even the very taking up of any substantive work. That is even more true in light of the well-known fact that, given the way in which the Conference operates, States will be able to protect their security interests in the course of any possible negotiations.

Germany perceives negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) as the next logical step on the multilateral disarmament agenda, and as such as a necessary intermediate step towards a world without nuclear weapons. The fact that in 2009 the Conference on Disarmament endorsed by consensus a programme of work which stipulated the commencement of FMCT negotiations clearly demonstrates the existence of a broad international consensus in this regard.

We actively participated in pertinent initiatives in 2011 by member States of the Conference — in particular, the side events convened by Australia and Japan — and we welcome the efforts of the five permanent members of the Security Council in advancing this issue. In view of the persistent inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start FMCT negotiations and substantive discussions on its other three core issues, we stand ready to consider new ways to turn the Conference once again into a functioning institution, in particular with a view to beginning FMCT negotiations. In that respect, we express in particular our support for the forward-oriented approach taken by the delegation of Canada in its draft resolution on the FMCT.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) constitutes an irreplaceable pillar of the global disarmament architecture. Fifteen years since its opening for signing, the CTBT has received nearly worldwide support. Its early entry into force would be a core element of advancing nuclear disarmament, and it remains a high strategic priority for Germany.

It is not enough for this Committee to repeat in its draft resolutions what it has said year in year out by simply restating agreed language. We have to do better than that. The Committee is called upon to make its contribution to international security in the light of present circumstances. The revitalization of multilateral disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament is an urgent task which needs to be addressed.

Ms. Higgie (New Zealand): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and my own country, New Zealand.

I take the floor to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.31, entitled “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments”.

As we noted in our general debate statement, the New Agenda Coalition remains committed to the achievement of a world free of nuclear weapons. The draft resolution reiterates the Coalition’s long-held view that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone for our activities towards this goal.

The draft resolution also underlines the importance of such issues as universalization of the Treaty and the fulfilment of past commitments. It underscores the expressions of concern at last year’s Review Conference over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. This was a key outcome of the Review Conference, in the Coalition’s view.
As in previous years, the text also recognizes recent developments in the nuclear disarmament sphere. It remains the Coalition’s expectation that the pace of these actions will accelerate in the months remaining before the first Preparatory Committee meeting in Vienna and lend momentum to our collective work in implementing the action plan.

The agreement at last year’s Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT on an action plan on nuclear disarmament was a positive development and provides a clear blueprint for action in the short term. The onus will now be on all stakeholders to ensure its full and effective implementation; only through such action will its promise of progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons be realized.

With this in mind, the draft resolution focuses very much on the implementation of the action plan in the coming review cycle leading up to the 2015 Review Conference. It draws attention, in particular, to the elements contained in action 5 of the action plan, and it calls on the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to implement them in a timely manner and report regularly on their efforts. It also underscores the importance of transparency activities, and encourages agreement on a standard reporting format as soon as possible.

We believe that early engagement and substantive progress in implementation of the steps agreed in May last year would be an important signal of the seriousness with which the nuclear-weapon States view their commitments as outlined in the action plan. The true test of the value of the 2010 Review Conference outcome will be the implementation of the commitments undertaken by all.

We encourage all Member States to support the draft resolution. We are confident that all colleagues will be keen to signal their wish also to see implementation of the NPT action plan and to advance its vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

The Chair: I shall now call those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of their right of reply.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (spoke in Arabic): We deeply regret having had to hear today the pathetic and propagandistic litany that the representative of the Republic of Korea repeats each year, in which he makes, point by point, all of the same allegations. His statement was clear proof that there is deliberate political bad faith and will, and an attempt to distort facts and mislead everyone.

Unfortunately, the representative of the Republic of Korea compels me to recall that his country does not respect and is not committed to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). His country lives in the shadow of a nuclear State, and authorizes the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, in flagrant violation of the provisions of the NPT. This represents lack of respect for the provisions of the Treaty by his country. We also wonder about the clandestine nuclear programmes developed by the Republic of Korea. We have a great deal of alarming information about Korea’s lack of respect for the NPT and other treaties and conventions. Therefore, we urge the representative of the Republic of Korea not to compel us to disclose this information in a further statement.

Mr. Ri Tong Li (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): The representative of South Korea referred to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a threat to peace and security, the same argument as was raised in the general debate. Once again I ask: What is the role of the 1,000 United States nuclear weapons that have existed for almost six decades? I ask him repeatedly, and he does not answer. But he refers to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as a threat. I totally and categorically reject his remarks as misleading the public and the participants in this meeting.

With regard to the threat on the Korean peninsula, I would like to briefly touch on three factors.

First, who created the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula? As I have said, it was the United States. In 1957, the United States brought in nuclear weapons and deployed them. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has just made a nuclear deterrent, as a self-defence measure. That is in line with the Charter, which unequivocally stipulates the right of sovereign States to defend themselves.

Secondly, who are the key players? The answer is related to the first factor: the United States brought in nuclear weapons and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea made a nuclear deterrent. Those are the two key players.

Thirdly, what is the solution? The Six-Party Talks are the solution. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has been pressing hard, and talks are under way.
now. Two weeks ago there was a meeting between the two parts of Korea. Now another meeting is scheduled. While that is going on, why are such sceptical remarks made, attacking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

With regard to the role of South Korea and United States nuclear weapons, South Korea came to know of the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States only in 1975 —

**The Chair:** I call the representative of Germany on a point of order.

**Mr. Hoffmann** (Germany): May I through you, Mr. Chair, ask the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea how it is that only a few minutes ago he requested that his country be referred to by its official name, but now refers to the Republic of Korea as South Korea? It is not easy to understand from my perspective. Maybe he can give some clarification.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I should call it again South Korea, because we are brothers. What should I call it? We are brothers. I need your clarification, Mr. Chair.

**The Chair:** The representative of Germany, on a point of order, asked how you could refer to the Republic of Korea as South Korea after you had complained that Canada referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as North Korea.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): That was because we are different countries, Canada and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But South Korea and North Korea — here I refer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as North Korea; no problem — are brothers.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea on a point of order.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): I ask my colleague from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to please call us the Republic of Korea, not South Korea.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I thank the representative of South Korea, but still we are one nation. We are supposed to be one country.

**The Chair:** I call the representative of the Republic of Korea once again on a point of order on this issue.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): We are sitting here in a United Nations meeting, and we are divided, so I say to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: “Please call us ‘the Republic of Korea’”.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I cannot say “Republic of Korea”. I ask him to call the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea “North Korea”. It is fair.

**The Chair:** Just to be logical on the issue, you just a few minutes ago asked somebody to refer to your country with your official name. Now the representative of another country with its official name within the United Nations has asked you to refer to his country with the official name. So please could you also obey that?

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): Let me say one thing, Mr. Chair. I am sorry for saying this wrong, but the Korean peninsula was divided. It was not our intention. There was a forced division. So we have regarded it as one country all the time; we have never regarded it as separated.

**The Chair:** But there is a reality within the United Nations. We have two Members from the Korean peninsula. We have the Republic of Korea and we have the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as Members, so of course we have to treat you as two separate nations, two separate Members in the United Nations. Whatever the perception in the national heritage may be is another matter, but in the United Nations we have two different countries.

Are you still going on with your statement in exercise of the right of reply, or did you exhaust it?

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): I will finish soon.

**The Chair:** Please do so.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): Concerning the role of South Korea, it only came to know of the presence of United States nuclear weapons in 1975, in a parliamentary meeting in the United States, when discussing the military budget for 1976. South Korea was shocked; the entire Korean nation was shocked. That is the fact. So South Korea has no power to speak on the Korean nuclear issue. It is the one that allowed nuclear weapons, so it has no
power to say anything about the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

With regard to enrichment, the Six-Party Talks are one key factor concerning the light water reactor and running enrichment. For the Democratic People's Republic of Korea there is one obligation.

Previously I asked South Korea to carefully study the principle of action for action. The key players move together. We cannot go first. It is there: action for action. That means we move together. In that regard, we have been having a dialogue concerning the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Concerning peace and security, South Korea said we are a threat and concern. But half a million troops were mobilized last August for joint exercises by the United States and South Korea.

The Chair: I thank the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea for his statement in exercise of the right of reply, and I have to remind him that there was a direct request from a full Member of the United Nations to refer to his country as the Republic of Korea. I hope that he can honour that request as, when speaking about the Republic of Korea, he used the words “South Korea”, but when speaking about his own nation he spoke of “the Democratic People's Republic of Korea”. So I say to him: Next time you speak about the Republic of Korea please use the official name.

I call on the representative of France, who also wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. Danon (France) (spoke in French): The representative of Iran mentioned France several times in his statement. I shall be able to return tomorrow in my own statement to our view of what is currently happening in Iran in the nuclear domain, but I should like to deal with one point.

At the end of the first paragraph of the Iranian written statement, Iran says that France “has made irrational statements threatening non-nuclear-weapon States”. I invite Iran to reread France's statements, in particular the last statement of the President of the Republic on the issue, that Iran’s “military, nuclear and ballistic ambitions could lead to a preventive attack against the Iranian sites, which would cause a major crisis that France does not want at any cost”. I emphasize “France does not want at any cost.” That is very clear; there is nothing to justify the phrase in the Iranian statement.

Furthermore, it is important to refocus on what is essential — our concerns, shared by the whole of the international community, about the Iranian nuclear programme. We need to refocus on Iran’s lack of respect for international legality, and in particular resolutions of the Security Council and the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We need to refocus on the very worrying information in the most recent IAEA report about Iranian nuclear activities, and on our calls to Iran to return to real, serious and constructive negotiations. It is high time, because these Iranian issues have now been prolonged for almost two years.

I shall be able to develop these points at greater length in my statement tomorrow afternoon.

Ms. Adamson (United Kingdom): Earlier today the representative of Iran said that the United Kingdom was clearly in non-compliance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). I absolutely reject that charge. The United Kingdom takes its NPT commitments extremely seriously and is a supporter of the NPT as a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime.

The Iranian statement today also questioned why we had talked about the 20 per cent enrichment activity. Iran itself, in August this year, announced that it had begun the transfer of centrifuges to its site at Qom in order to triple its capacity to enrich uranium to 20 per cent. That directly contravenes six Security Council resolutions requiring Iran to suspend enrichment, and illustrates how inconsistent with peaceful purposes Iran's illegal enrichment programme is. There is no credible civilian justification for producing that much — 20 per cent — enriched uranium.

I shall not go into further details, other than to say that many of those issues have been raised in Vienna, at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), most recently during the General Conference, and often during Board of Governors meetings.

I did not have a chance yesterday to read out a number of paragraphs in my statement, due to lack of time, but I wish now to very much dispute the statement that the United Kingdom was in non-compliance with the NPT, and also to put on record that some of the issues
which I would have mentioned have been repeatedly discussed in the IAEA.

Mr. Rim Kap-soo (Republic of Korea): I would like to respond to the allegations made by the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Even though he called my country “South Korea”, I shall refer to North Korea by its official name — the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

The representative of North Korea argued several things. First, South Korea — the Republic of Korea — is a party to the Six-Party Talks, but North Korea denies the presence of the Republic of Korea. Several weeks ago the Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea had bilateral meetings with regard to presence in the Six-Party Talks. North Korea’s argument was to deny the counterpart of the bilateral meetings that we had several weeks ago.

With regard to the nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula, in 1990 North Korea declared the non-nuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Since then, the Government of the Republic of Korea has declared that there are no nuclear weapons in our territory. Conversely, North Korea staged two nuclear tests, in 2006 and 2009. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea revealed its nuclear enrichment facility in Yongbyong last year. That caused the international community grave concern, as it could open a second path for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to develop nuclear weapons.

Today, in addition to the Republic of Korea, several countries expressed grave concern about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear activities, including its uranium enrichment programme. In accordance with the input of the international community, my Government will continue to pursue a principled approach in resolving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s nuclear issue, while leaving open the door to dialogue.

I take this opportunity to urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to respond to our calls to demonstrate its willingness and sincerity with regard to denuclearization through concrete actions, instead of the provocation shown today.

The Chair: I can see that there is a deeper meaning in using words on the Korean peninsula, and I certainly do not have a personal problem if in brotherly and sisterly harmony you call each other North and South Korea, but please agree between yourselves what you will do in that respect.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am sorry to take the floor again, but in view of the statements made by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom I am obliged to clarify some points.

First, with regard to the threatening statement made by the President of France, we are glad that France has corrected its statement, but it was very clear in the statement distributed by the media that it was a threatening statement, in clear violation of Article 2 of the Charter. We registered that issue officially within the United Nations.

The representative of France claimed that the issue of Iran is of international concern. I ask him to refer to the statements made constantly by 120 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in support of Iran’s right to a peaceful nuclear programme. The judgements of a few countries on the Security Council, which at the United Nations we sometimes describe as the Council of P-5, are not indicative of what is or is not the concern of the international community.

I ask the Committee simply to look at the statements of States members of the General Assembly, non-governmental organizations and various other international organizations, to discover the international community’s real concern. It is the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States and their continued development and modernization of those nuclear weapons. That is the real concern.

There is an attempt to put up a smokescreen by trying to divert the attention of the international media and the public to highlight some baseless allegations. Iran’s nuclear programme has always been, and always will be, for peaceful purposes. No country within the membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has ever received the number of inspector/days that Iran receives. More than 5,000 inspector/days of inspections have been carried out in Iran’s nuclear facilities, and not a shred of evidence has ever been found with regard to the diversion of its peaceful nuclear activities to military purposes.

With regard to the claims based on forged documents, we have already submitted to the IAEA 117 pages explaining why the documents are forged and fake. France and the United Kingdom have recently concluded an agreement on nuclear-sharing, exchanging
information on their nuclear weapons and their tests, which is clearly in violation of article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). They are in non-compliance with the NPT, and they should be accountable for their actions.

The United Kingdom representative again referred to the issue of the 20 per cent, claiming that the transfer of the centrifuges from Natanz to Qom is a source of concern. How would it be a source of concern while all the activities are being carried out under the IAEA?

Let us not forget the constant threat made by some countries, including the Zionist regime, to attack the Iranian nuclear facilities. Let us also not forget the assassination by the intelligence services of the United Kingdom and the Zionist regime, assassinating and terrorizing Iranian nuclear university professors. We are obliged to protect our nuclear scientists; we are obliged to protect those facilities. We have no choice but to transfer sensitive facilities to an area out of the reach of those threatening us.

I turn to the issue of the Security Council resolutions. Our position is very clear — we have already sent 20 pages of our argument with regard to the illegality of those resolutions. The Council resolutions have never decided that Iran’s nuclear issue is a threat to international peace and security. No IAEA report has ever reported any case of non-compliance. So those politically motivated resolutions asking for the suspension of Iran’s purely peaceful activities have never had any legal basis, and never will have. We reject them all, and we will never implement them. Our position is very clear in that regard.

The Chair: I remind delegations that it is already past 6 p.m. I want to conclude this debate today, so I hope that representatives can be very brief.

Mr. Ri Tong Li (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea): I shall be very brief.

The representative of South Korea again raised the question of there being no United States nuclear weapons in South Korea. It is true that in 1991 the Bush Administration made that announcement, but it was not followed by verification, so we cannot believe it.

Secondly, South Korea again says that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is a threat and cause of concern. Last year in the Western Sea off the Korean peninsula, in our territorial waters, South Korea held a military exercise with live ammunition, which fell in our territorial waters. We responded. The situation almost spun out of control. Now in that same place a military exercise is again scheduled; a United States aircraft carrier, the USS George Washington, is in Korean peninsula territorial waters. It is everyday news that the George Washington is coming into our waters. It is of great concern to the North-East Asia region.

Mr. Reid (United States of America): I am very mindful of the 6 p.m. witching hour that we are passing.

Suffice it to say, for the record, that the United States gladly associates itself with the most recent interventions of the representatives of both Her Majesty’s Government and our fine allies in the Republic of Korea.

Ms. Anderson (United Kingdom): I do not want to prolong this discussion, but simply wish to reiterate what I said earlier about the United Kingdom taking its Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons commitments extremely seriously, and rejecting the suggestion that we are in non-compliance with them. I also wish to put on record that I reject any claims of assassinations of particular scientists, but do not wish to add anything.

Mr. Rim Kap-soo (Republic of Korea): I wish to take up two points. One is the meaning of “brother” raised by the representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, who said that South Korea and North Korea were brothers. I remind him of the meaning of “brother”. Last year the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea sank a ship of the Republic of Korea, with the loss of 36 navy lives. And the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea staged three rounds of shelling of a Korean island, which cost four lives, including civilians. Is it a brother who killed his brother? I do not think so. Brothers do not kill each other. In this sense, I do not accept “brother” from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.

As I have mentioned, last year the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea attacked the Republic of Korea twice, which cost the lives of 40 people. The military exercises of the Republic of Korea and the United States are conducted to strengthen deterrent capabilities against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s military provocations. Therefore, the Republic of Korea urges the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to stop further provocation.
The Chair: I thank all the participants in this very interesting debate.

I remind delegations once again that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 3 p.m. tomorrow, 14 October. I urge all delegations to make every effort to meet the deadline, in order to afford the Secretariat the time to process the documents expeditiously.

I thank our interpreters for their endurance and flexibility this afternoon.

The meeting rose at 6.10 p.m.